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INTRODUCTION 1 
Like many American cities, Atlanta experienced an infrastructure boom in the post-war years that 2 
resulted in a network of highways and interstates encouraging an automobile-dependent lifestyle 3 
for its residents.  With no natural boundaries, Atlanta’s growth sprawled outward creating suburbs 4 
in all directions.  Today, Atlanta is home to 4.5 million residents whose primary mode of 5 
transportation is the car.  The resulting congestion across the metro region costs $1,130 per 6 
commuter per year (1) and congestion remains high on the list of resident’s complaints (2).  While 7 
the advent of automated vehicles (“AVs”) is poised to usher in an era of unprecedented road safety 8 
among other benefits, it is likely that the technology will lead to unexpected changes in the urban 9 
fabric of the city, similarly to the way cars reshaped Atlanta a century ago.  10 
 One particularly harmful potential consequence of AVs is the likelihood that private 11 
owners will begin to increase the number of trips their vehicles make, because now the vehicle can 12 
make trips unsupervised by human drivers.  Many owners will value the ability to send a vehicle 13 
home unsupervised in order to avoid paying for increasingly expensive parking in the city, but this 14 
behavior potentially doubles the amount of vehicle-miles traveled (“VMT”) accrued.  Any increase 15 
in VMT is undesirable, but a sharp uptick in peak hour VMT in Atlanta would be gridlock 16 
inducing.   17 
AVs are not yet commercially available, so lawmakers have the rare opportunity to take 18 
steps to prevent this undesirable behavior before it begins, rather than having to retroactively alter 19 
behavior after it has become commonplace.  One pre-emptive solution to mitigating unnecessary 20 
VMT is to charge empty AVs (“zombie cars”) a tax for each mile they drive.  If the tax is set high 21 
enough, it could deter owners from sending their cars on unnecessary trips, choosing to park 22 
instead of accruing additional VMT. 23 
This report sets out the formula that jurisdictions should use to set the rates for owners of 24 
internal-combustion engine AVs (“ICE AVs”) and owners of electric AVs (“EAVs”) and applies 25 
these rates to the Atlanta metro area.  Upon analysis, the rate should be set to at least $0.14 per 26 




Automated vehicles 31 
Automated vehicles (frequently shorted to “AVs” and interchangeable referred to as “autonomous 32 
vehicles” or “self-driving cars” or “driverless cars”) are a new mode of transportation enabled by 33 
advanced computers.  Using a suite of cameras, radars, LiDAR, and other sensors, AVs are capable 34 
of sensing the environment around them and making decisions on how to proceed based on a pre-35 
determined user input, such as an occupant wanting to be delivered to a particular location.   36 
 The Society for Automotive Engineers International (SAE) recognizes six levels of 37 
automation for vehicles (some of which are already being sold commercially) as outlined in the 38 
SAE International Standard J3016 published in 2014 (3).  Figure 1 below is SAE’s summary chart 39 
explaining the six levels of automation.  Essentially, Levels 0 through 2 require human drivers to 40 
monitor the driving environment, while Levels 3 through 5 allow the automated driving system to 41 
monitor the driving environment.  While Level 5 personal vehicles are not yet commercially 42 
available, models are currently being developed and are estimated to be available to the buying 43 
public in the 2020s. 44 
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 1 
FIGURE 1. Summary chart of SAE International’s Levels of Driving Automation for On-2 
Road Vehicles. 3 
 4 
AV developers, their timelines, and their goals 5 
There are dozens of companies vying to be the first company to bring an AV to market.  Most 6 
producers are developing either Level 4 or Level 5 autonomous vehicles (4).  Some producers have 7 
stated that they intend to introduce AVs to the market in the same manner that conventional cars 8 
are sold, via personal ownership by individual owners.  Other producers are planning on producing 9 
vehicles expressly for ride-sharing applications like Uber and Lyft.  Table 1 below summarizes the 10 
stated development goals of the most prominent automakers and technology companies working 11 
towards AVs (4).   12 
In a 2016 study, Lavasani et al. examined the stated development timelines for AV 13 
producers and studied the adoption rate of various other disruptive technologies to determine an 14 
S-curve model for AV market penetration in the United States (5).  The researchers estimate that 15 
there will be a cumulative 1.3 million AVs sold by 2030 and that the market saturation point for 16 
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TABLE 1  Development Timelines of auto manufacturers and technology companies 1 
pursuing AVs 2 
 3 
 Manufacturer  Stated 
Timeline 
Goal Level of 
Autonomy 
Goal Business Model 
GM Est. 2018 Level 5 Ride-sharing  
Ford with Argo AI  2021 Level 4 Ride-sharing 
Honda with Waymo 2020 Level 4 Personal Ownership 
Toyota 2020 Level 4 Ride-sharing 
Renault-Nissan with 
Microsoft 
2020 Level 4 Personal Ownership 
Renault-Nissan with 
Microsoft 
2025 Level 5 Personal Ownership 
Volvo with Uber 2021 Level 4 Personal Ownership 
Hyundai 2020 Level 4 Personal Ownership 
Hyundai  2030 Level 5 Personal Ownership 
Daimler with Uber Early 2020s Level 4 Ride-sharing 
Fiat-Chrysler with Uber 2021 Level 4 Personal Ownership 
BMW with Intel and 
Mobileye 
2021 Level 4 Personal Ownership 
Tesla 2017+ Level 5 Personal Ownership 
 4 
Automated vehicles and VMT 5 
The rapid development of AVs brings the promise of a radically different transportation future.  6 
AV proponents claim that driverless cars will increase safety, ease congestion (and therefore 7 
decrease emissions), and decrease commute stressors and road rage (6).  While these positive 8 
externalities may come to pass, AVs will undoubtable introduce negative externalities as well.   9 
Currently, many people choose to own and operate personal vehicles because they are 10 
much more convenient than other modes of travel.  Conventional cars are available to the owner 11 
at a moment’s notice, can easily store and transport the owner’s cumbersome stuff (like kids school 12 
and extracurricular gear), and can go almost anywhere at any time.  Personally owned AVs will 13 
be able to do all of these things and more.  AVs will create an even more tolerable ride than 14 
conventional cars by allowing the occupants to devote their attention to something other than the 15 
ride itself.  It is likely that AV owners will likely tolerate a longer ride (in time and distance) than 16 
they would if they were actively driving a conventional car (7).  Additionally, an AV can avoid 17 
the cost of paying for parking in high-demand areas simply by dropping of its occupants then 18 
driving empty to a free parking location regardless of how far away that free parking location 19 
happens to be.  The AV can be programmed to return to the owner’s location at a pre-determined 20 
time to pick the owner up again.  This behavior is deemed “looping” and the trips the AV makes 21 
while devoid of passengers are referred to as “zombie trips” made by “zombie cars”.   22 
Vehicle miles traveled, or VMT, refers to the number of miles a vehicle (or group of 23 
vehicles) travels over a given period of time.  Because the space on the road network is a finite 24 
resource, every additional mile of VMT exerts a marginal social cost that manifests differently 25 
under different conditions.  For example, the marginal social cost for a “nighttime trip in a hybrid 26 
on a lonely stretch of highway” would be much lower than a trip “in a poorly tuned Hummer on a 27 
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busy street on a smoggy day” (8).  Generally, as VMT increases in urban areas congestion, delay, 1 
emissions, roadway damage, and noise increase as well (8).   2 
To illustrate the detrimental effects looping behavior has on VMT, imagine a person who 3 
commutes from the suburbs to the CBD for work on a daily basis.  The person usually drives from 4 
home to work, parks, then drives from work to home (or some other location before going home).  5 
If this person owned an AV, they would be able to ride to work while doing something other than 6 
driving, perhaps reading or doing their makeup.  They would get out of the car at work, let the car 7 
drive to the most convenient free parking location, and program the car to return at the end of the 8 
day to pick them up again and take them home.  Where there once were only two trips (to work, 9 
then home), there are now four trips (to work, then to a free parking location, then to work again, 10 
then home).  If these additional, unnecessary trips become commonplace among a large group of 11 
AV owners, VMT will skyrocket causing the marginal social costs of trips to skyrocket as well.  12 
Unfortunately, the AV owners won’t care because they aren’t personally affected; only their cars 13 
will experience the excess congestion and inconvenience while their owners are somewhere else 14 
entirely.  Without an appropriate policy intervention, these zombie cars will overrun our roads and 15 
wreak havoc on our transportation network. 16 
 17 
Pigovian taxes on socially sub-optimal behavior 18 
Economist Arthur Pigou explained that when a producer’s private interest diverges from the social 19 
interest, the producer does not have an incentive to either internalize the cost of the social harm or 20 
to externalize the cost of the social benefit.  In essence, the economically rational producer will 21 
always maximize his own private benefit without regard to society’s harm or benefit (9).  In the 22 
case of AVs, owners will seek to maximize their own benefit (avoiding the cost of parking in the 23 
CBD, for example), and in so doing, will inflict a great social harm in the form of increased peak-24 
hour VMT and congestion. 25 
A Pigovian tax is a tax designed to internalize the marginal social cost of some negative 26 
externality in order to increase social benefits.  Congestion charges are a common form of Pigovian 27 
tax applied in transportation.  Two of the largest-scale congestion charge projects are the Singapore 28 
Area License Scheme and the London Congestion Charge.   29 
 30 
The Singapore Area Licensing Scheme 31 
The first-ever congestion pricing system was the Singapore Area Licensing Scheme (SALS) 32 
established in the 1975.  The system was designed to correct the “environmental pollution, 33 
deteriorating quality of life in the city center, and congestion on limited urban roads” quickly 34 
developing in Singapore (10).  At this time, several other cities had experimented with encouraging 35 
people “to ride public transport or organize car pools,” but these experiments had little success 36 
(10).  Singapore decided to pursue an economic experiment and began requiring that drivers 37 
purchase a special supplemental license and display it on all vehicles driven in the designated 38 
Restricted Zone during peak hours (10).  The SALS was updated to the Electronic Road Pricing 39 
(ERP) system in 1998.   40 
Singapore’s ERP is a pay-as-you-use system designed to charge drivers when entering the 41 
Restricted Zone and when using specific roads inside the Restricted Zone during peak hours.  The 42 
fee varies depending on vehicle class and level of congestion.  Unlike traditional American tolling 43 
systems, Singapore’s drivers don’t stop at a tollbooth to pay, but rather have tolls deducted from 44 
prepaid cards via overhead gantries.  This allows traffic to move through the tolling stations at full 45 
speed which further reduces congestion (11).   46 
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After the implementation of the ERP system, vehicle entries into the Restricted Zone fell 1 
by 70%.  This correlates with an average speed increase from 19 km/h to 36 km/h and a morning 2 
peak traffic volume reduction of 45%.  Both of these metrics exceeded the government’s best-case 3 
scenarios (12).   4 
 5 
The London Congestion Charge 6 
The London Congestion Charging Scheme (LCCS), while achieving the same goals as the 7 
Singapore ERP, is designed significantly differently.  The congestion charge went into effect in 8 
2003 and has been maintained to the present (13).  Whereas Singapore has a charge to enter the 9 
Restricted Zone and multiple charging points within the Restricted Zone, London has a fixed daily 10 
rate for entering the cordon area just once.  Currently, drivers who enter the London charging zone 11 
between 7:00 am and 6:00 pm, Monday through Friday, pay £11.50 per day.  While this daily rate 12 
can be adjusted down for residents and vehicles meeting special requirements, it is applied evenly 13 
throughout the charging zone regardless of which roads are used, time spent in the zone, current 14 
congestion levels, or re-entry of the zone during the same day (14).   15 
After implementing the charge in 2003, the cordon area saw 20,000 fewer vehicles per day, 16 
thus dropping the automobile mode share from 12% to 10%.  This two-percentage point reduction 17 
led to a 37% increase in average speed, a 30% decline in peak period auto delays, and a 50% 18 
decline in peak period bus delays (13).  Clearly, society at large saw benefits from the Pigovian-19 
style tax on driving in London’s congested core.  Because individual drivers are also members of 20 
society, they also received these benefits after paying for them through the congestion charge. 21 
 22 
Uses of Revenues from Pigovian Taxes 23 
Both the Singapore and the London systems successfully generate positive net revenues in addition 24 
to reducing congestion.  In Singapore, annual gross revenue in 2004 was approximately £25 25 
million and operating expenses were approximately £5 million.  Therefore, net revenue for the 26 
Singapore ERP was approximately £20 million (12).  In London, the LCCS was expected to 27 
generate £118 million in fees and £72 million in fines for a total gross revenue of £190 million in 28 
2005.  LCCS operating expenses for the same year were estimated to be £92 million, therefore, 29 
the net revenue for the system was estimated to be £98 million for 2005 (13).   30 
In both cities, a majority of the net revenue generated is used to build and maintain the 31 
public transit systems that shoulder the extra burden of passengers switching away from private 32 
cars.  In Singapore, a mass rapid transit (MRT) system was built and includes integrated bus, rail, 33 
and taxi services (12).  In London, TfL expanded the bus network by adding additional capacity, 34 
decreasing headways, and prioritizing buses along the roads before the LCCS went into effect.  The 35 
expanded transit network was ready to accept the additional passengers well before they arrived 36 
(12). 37 
 38 
VMT Taxes 39 
Another form of Pigovian taxes on road use are VMT taxes, or taxes charged for each mile a 40 
vehicle travels.  These taxes can be varied across vehicle class, road class, current congestion, 41 
vehicle occupancy, or any other trackable feature of the vehicle or the road. 42 
In recent years, the U.S. has seen an increasing interest in charging VMT taxes in order to 43 
more accurately capture the true cost of driving (8).  Currently, roads are paid for through a 44 
combination of state and federal gas tax revenues, tag fees, and federal funds.  While all drivers 45 
contribute to this funding in some way, most do not directly associate these taxes and fees with the 46 
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cost of actually using the roads (8).  They view the roads as quasi-public goods and therefore as 1 
free to use, and since most people already have a car, driving everywhere makes the most financial 2 
sense at an individual level.  This is a perverse incentive where the nominally free nature of the 3 
road network causes demand to spike too high during peak hours resulting intense congestion.  4 
Theoretically, a noticeable Pigovian tax on miles traveled should cause drivers to reconsider their 5 
trip-taking behavior.  If a VMT tax is implemented correctly, some drivers should choose to take 6 
alternative modes or choose to avoid taking the trip altogether (15).  Either of these options will 7 
result in decreased regional VMT, and, therefore, decreased congestion.   8 
 9 
Oregon’s VMT tax pilot project 10 
In 2006, the state of Oregon began a yearlong pilot project to study the feasibility of VMT taxes 11 
as a replacement of state gas taxes.  The pilot project also considered the trip-taking behavior 12 
changes associated with charging an additional congestion fee on a per mile basis.  The researchers 13 
recruited 299 drivers and two gas stations to participate.  Drivers had a variety of different mileage 14 
tracking products installed on their vehicles and were instructed to fill up their tanks at the 15 
participating gas stations.  VMT was recorded at the pump and the drivers were charged an 16 
itemized mileage fee in addition to the cost of the gasoline.  Some drivers were also charged a 17 
congestion charge.  At the study’s conclusion, Oregon confirmed that concept of VMT taxes is 18 
viable and effective.  Additionally, the study produced a 22% decline in VMT when drivers were 19 
charged an additional fee for driving on congested roads during peak hours (16).  This VMT 20 
decline aligns with the VMT reduction documented in London after the implementation of the 21 
congestion charge.  22 
 23 
Massachusetts’ AV VMT tax proposal 24 
Two lawmakers in the state legislature of Massachusetts recently proposed a bill regulating 25 
AV operation in the state that included a provision to charge AVs $0.025 per mile to drive in the 26 
state (17).  This was explicitly labeled a “road user fee” to compensate for the requirement that 27 
AVs be zero-emission vehicles and therefore pay no state gas taxes towards road maintenance.  28 
Since the stated goal of this policy is to collect a replacement of the gas tax, it is unlikely to generate 29 
the same behavioral response as a tax designed to limit VMT.  In 2011, Guo et al. at the Mineta 30 
Transportation Institute studied the behavioral responses to the 2005-2006 Oregon VMT test (18).  31 
Guo subjected some drivers to a supplemental charge for driving and found that “charging a 32 
noticeably higher fee for driving in congested conditions successfully achieved the goal of 33 
inducing households to reduce their VMT in those times and places where congestion is most a 34 
problem” (18).  The researchers also found that drivers subjected to a gas tax replacement system 35 
drove “more instead of less because gas became essentially cheaper” (18).  These households were 36 
paying a flat rate based on VMT, but they paid it only once a month, therefore the effect of the 37 
payment was disassociated with their actual driving habits.   38 
 39 
The Zombie VMT Tax Proposal 40 
Since Donald Shoup’s groundbreaking book “The High Cost of Free Parking” was released in 41 
2005, planners and policymakers across the country have been implementing polices to increase 42 
the cost of parking in urban areas, or to limit the oversupply of parking by shifting from parking 43 
minimums to parking maximums (19).  While this change is beneficial overall, it complicates the 44 
parking situation for AVs.  If urban parking is too expensive or inadequate, zombie AVs will drive 45 
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further to find free or extremely cheap parking.  This behavior would increase VMT and increase 1 
the marginal social cost of driving in the urban area.  2 
Future planners and policymakers must ensure that the cost of parking is cheaper than the 3 
cost of looping, thereby incentivizing the choice to park instead of loop.  They can either lower 4 
the cost of parking or raise the cost of looping.  Lowering the cost of parking does not lead to 5 
desirable outcomes for cities, so they should instead raise the cost of looping.  One possible way 6 
to raise the cost of looping is to charge a Pigovian tax on the VMT accrued while looping.  The 7 
AV owner will then have to choose between paying to park and paying to loop.  If the cost of 8 
looping exceeds the cost of parking, the economically rational AV owner will choose to park 9 
thereby saving the marginal social cost increases due to unnecessary VMT.   10 
 11 
METHODOLOGY 12 
Several papers have attempted to find “optimal” VMT rates to be used for congestion mitigation.  13 
In 2005, Small and Perry found that the optimal rate was around $0.15 per mile for both the United 14 
States and the United Kingdom (20).  In 2016, Zhang and Kockelman proposed a rate of $0.52 per 15 
mile for polycentric cities like Atlanta (21).  While congestion mitigation is similar, in essence, to 16 
limiting zombie VMT, these rates reflect a policy goal that seeks to change existing behavior.  The 17 
policy objective of a Zombie Tax is to discourage the future adoption of a behavior that is not yet 18 
technologically feasible.   19 
If implemented before AVs are commercially available for sale, the Zombie Tax is a 20 
proactive attempt to limit future negative externalities by limiting the attractiveness of the 21 
detrimental behavior.  The derivation of the rate must reflect the policy goals of the rate.  It is also 22 
necessary to derive two different rates (one rate for internal combustion engine AVs (“ICE AVs”) 23 
and another rate for electric AVs (“EAVs”)) because of the different operating costs of the different 24 
vehicle types.  Below are general derivations for the two rates, then those rate formulas are applied 25 
to the Atlanta area and are calibrated for mitigating zombie VMT during the morning peak period.  26 
It is possible that the rate would vary by time of day or by level of congestion; the Atlanta 27 
derivations are just one example of a practical application of the generally derived rate formula. 28 
   29 
General derivation of the Zombie Tax for Internal Combustion Engine AVs 30 
The break-even point between parking and looping is  31 
 32 
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 33 
 34 
The ICE AV owner will likely value the break-even point as follows: 35 
 36 
𝑐𝑡 = 𝑎𝑏 37 
 38 
where,  39 
c = cost to park per hour  40 
t = hours spent parked 41 
a = cost to loop per hour 42 
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The cost per hour to park (c) and the hours spent parked (t) are straightforward.  The cost per hour 1 





∗ 𝑠 4 
 5 
where, 6 
 f = fuel cost per gallon 7 
 m = average mpg  8 
 s = average speed in mph 9 
 10 
The hours spent looping (b) can be found as follows: 11 
 12 






 d = distance in miles covered while looping  16 
 17 













Now, the break-even point can be rewritten as 22 
 23 










𝑐𝑡 >  
𝑓𝑑
𝑚
 → 𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑝 31 
 32 
and if 33 
 34 
𝑐𝑡 <  
𝑓𝑑
𝑚
 → 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘 35 
 36 
To discourage looping, the Zombie Tax should be implemented at a set rate per mile traveled.  The 37 
new break-even point would be 38 
 39 
𝑐𝑡 =  
𝑓𝑑
𝑚
+ 𝑣𝑑 40 
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where, 1 
 2 
 v = the tax rate per mile in dollars 3 
 4 
The rational ICE AV owner would make the following choices 5 
 6 
If  7 
𝑐𝑡 >  
𝑓𝑑
𝑚
+ 𝑣𝑑 → 𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑝 8 
 9 
and if  10 
 11 
𝑐𝑡 <  
𝑓𝑑
𝑚
+ 𝑣𝑑 → 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘 12 
 13 
Solving for v, the tax rate at which ICE AV owners are indifferent between parking and looping is 14 
 15 








In order for a rational ICE AV owner to choose to park instead of loop, the optimal VMT tax rate 18 










Assume that a given ICE AV owner pays $795 for an annual parking pass at work, works 8 hours 23 
per day (for a total of 2000 hours per year), lives 5 miles away, pays $2.50 per gallon of gas and 24 
owns a car that gets 20 miles to the gallon. 25 
 26 
c = 0.3975  27 
t = 8 28 
d = 10 29 
f = 2.50 30 
 m = 20  31 
 32 






= 0.318 − 0.125 = 0.193 33 
 34 
In this scenario, any tax rate above $0.193 per mile will cause the ICE AV owner to choose to park 35 
instead of loop.   36 
 37 
General derivation of the Zombie Tax for Electric Vehicles 38 
The break-even point between parking and looping is  39 
 40 
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑔 41 
 42 
Marinelli   11 
The EAV owner will likely value the break-even point as follows: 1 
 2 
𝑐𝑡 = 𝑔𝑑 3 
 4 
where,  5 
c = cost to park per hour  6 
t = hours spent parked 7 
g = cost to loop per mile 8 
d = miles covered while looping 9 
 10 
The cost per hour to park (c) and the hours spent parked (t) are straightforward.  The cost per mile 11 








 k = cost of 1 kWh of electricity 17 
 r = average kWh/100mi. efficiency rating  18 
 19 



















𝑐𝑡 >  
𝑑𝑘𝑟
100
 → 𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑝 33 
 34 
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To discourage looping, the Zombie Tax should be implemented at a set rate per mile traveled.  The 1 





+ 𝑣𝑑 4 
 5 
where, 6 
 v = the tax rate per mile in dollars 7 
 8 
The new break-even point would be 9 
 10 
𝑐𝑡 =  
𝑑𝑘𝑟
100
+ 𝑣𝑑 11 
 12 
The rational EAV owner would make the following choices 13 
 14 
If  15 
𝑐𝑡 >  
𝑑𝑘𝑟
100
+ 𝑣𝑑 → 𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑝 16 
 17 
and if  18 
 19 
𝑐𝑡 <  
𝑑𝑘𝑟
100
+ 𝑣𝑑 → 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑘 20 
 21 
Solving for v, the tax rate at which ICE AV owners are indifferent between parking and looping is 22 
 23 








In order for a rational EAV owner to choose to park instead of loop, the optimal VMT tax rate 26 










Assume that a given EAV owner pays $795 for an annual parking pass at work, works 8 hours per 31 
day (for a total of 2000 hours per year), lives 5 miles away, pays $0.05 per kWh for electricity, 32 
and drives an EV that is rated for 33 kWh/100 mi. 33 
 34 
c = 0.3975  35 
t = 8 36 
d = 10 37 
k = $0.05 38 
r = 30 39 






= 0.318 − 0.015 = 0.303 40 
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In this scenario, any tax rate above $0.303 per mile will cause the EAV owner to choose to park 1 
instead of loop.    2 
 3 
Derivation of the Zombie Tax for ICE Vehicles for Atlanta 4 
In order to derive the appropriate rate for the city of Atlanta, several sources were used to determine 5 
the appropriate values for the five variables required for the calculation of v.  All values are for 6 
2015. 7 
 First, for the cost of parking (c), Pringle’s 2016 thesis “Parking policies for resurging cities: 8 
An Atlanta case study” was consulted (22).  Pringle gives the average daily cost of parking in the 9 
Downtown and Midtown areas (considered to be the CBD for Atlanta) as $11.74 and $8.83 10 
respectively in 2015.  These figures were divided by 24 to arrive at an average hourly rate, then 11 
averaged together to arrive at an average geographically appropriate rate of about $0.86 per hour.  12 
This includes the cost of both hourly lots and monthly lots.  Clearly, the actual parking structure 13 
encountered by AV owners in the Atlanta area will vary greatly, so the calculation of this particular 14 
figure is highly subject to fluctuation based on the underlying assumptions.   15 
 Second, for the time spent parked (t), it is assumed that the average commuter works 8 16 
hours per day and therefore needs to park their car for 8 hours per day. 17 
 Third, for the distance covered while looping (d), a 2015 study by the Brookings 18 
Metropolitan Policy Program found that the average commute distance for Atlanta was 12.8 miles 19 
(25).  For the Atlanta-specific application, we are finding the appropriate rate to curb zombie cars 20 
during the morning peak when the majority of the congestion is due to commuters driving from 21 
the suburbs to the central business district.  In order for a commuter vehicle to loop, the vehicle 22 
must travel those 12.8 miles back to the free parking location (assumed to be home during the 23 
morning peak period), then another 12.8 miles to pick up the AV owner at the end of the workday.  24 
Therefore, d is set equal to the cumulative miles covered on average, or 25.6 for this Atlanta 25 
derivation (25). 26 
Fourth, for the fuel cost per gallon (f), the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that the 27 
average price of a gallon of gasoline in the Atlanta metro area was $2.316 for 2015 (23).  28 
 Finally, for the average mpg (m), the National Transportation Statistics (NTS) guide for 29 
the fourth quarter of 2017 estimates that the average mpg for all vehicles operating in the United 30 
States was 17.9 miles per gallon in 2015.  While this is a rough estimate when applied to Atlanta, 31 
it is difficult to obtain a more accurate estimate for the metro area (24).   32 
 Applying these values to the generally derived breakeven point, we find that any tax rate 33 
above $0.140 per mile should incentivize an ICE AV owner to park instead of loop in Atlanta in 34 
2015. 35 
 36 
c = 0.86 37 
t = 8  38 
d = 25.6 39 
f = 2.316 40 
 m = 17.9  41 
 42 
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Derivation of the Zombie Tax for EVs for Atlanta 1 
In order to derive the appropriate rate for the city of Atlanta, several sources were used to determine 2 
the appropriate values for the five variables required for the calculation of v.  All values are for 3 
2015. 4 
 First, for the cost of parking (c), Pringle’s 2016 thesis “Parking policies for resurging cities: 5 
An Atlanta case study” was consulted (22).  Pringle gives the average daily cost of parking in the 6 
Downtown and Midtown areas (considered to be the CBD for Atlanta) as $11.74 and $8.83 7 
respectively in 2015.  These figures were divided by 24 to arrive at an average hourly rate, then 8 
averaged together to arrive at an average geographically appropriate rate of about $0.86 per hour.  9 
This includes the cost of both hourly lots and monthly lots.  Clearly, the actual parking structure 10 
encountered by AV owners in the Atlanta area will vary greatly, so the calculation of this particular 11 
figure is highly subject to fluctuation based on the underlying assumptions.   12 
 Second, for the time spent parked (t), it is assumed that the average commuter works 8 13 
hours per day and therefore needs to park their car for 8 hours per day. 14 
 Third, for the distance covered while looping (d), a 2015 study by the Brookings 15 
Metropolitan Policy Program found that the average commute distance for Atlanta was 12.8 miles 16 
(25).  For the Atlanta-specific application, we are finding the appropriate rate to curb zombie cars 17 
during the morning peak when the majority of the congestion is due to commuters driving from 18 
the suburbs to the central business district.  In order for a commuter vehicle to loop, the vehicle 19 
must travel those 12.8 miles back to the free parking location (assumed to be home during the 20 
morning peak period), then another 12.8 miles to pick up the AV owner at the end of the workday.  21 
Therefore, d is set equal to the cumulative miles covered on average, or 25.6 for this Atlanta 22 
derivation (25). 23 
Fourth, for the electricity cost per kWh (k), the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that 24 
the average electricity cost in the Atlanta metro area was $0.125 per kWh for 2015 (23). 25 
Finally, for the average kWh/100mi. efficiency rating of EVs (r), the U.S. Department of 26 
Energy estimated that the average electric vehicle used 33 kWh per 100 miles of travel in 2015 27 
(26). 28 
 Applying these values to the generally derived breakeven point, we find that any tax rate 29 
above $0.228 per mile should incentivize an EAV owner to park instead of loop in Atlanta in 2015. 30 
 31 
c = 0.86 32 
t = 8  33 
d = 25.6 34 
k = 0.125 35 
r = 33 36 
 37 






= 0.269 − 0.041 = 0.228 38 
 39 
Assumptions for the Atlanta Case Study 40 
While the equation for valuing whether to park or loop is simple, it is made so by several 41 
assumptions.  First, the equation assumes that the driver is making the decision to park or loop not 42 
circle.  Circling is an already familiar premise; when the time spent at one’s destination is short, it 43 
is often more beneficial for the driver to circle the block while waiting for the trip to conclude 44 
(perhaps, a passenger has gone into a building to drop off something and will be back quickly).  45 
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With the assistance of AVs, there will be no drivers or passengers, merely occupants, so a person 1 
who is the solo occupant can now program their AV to circle the block while they run inside to 2 
complete the errand.   3 
An extension of the first assumption forms the second assumption: that the length of time 4 
spent at the destination is known.  This is fairly common for a person going to work, and work 5 
trips are often the purpose of a majority of trips made during peak hours.  Most people travel to 6 
work, stay for several hours then leave work to complete other trips and eventually to return home.  7 
Therefore, the hours spent parked (t) is usually a known variable.  There are mathematical 8 
techniques to capture the uncertainty in t, but those techniques are not employed here.   9 
 A large exception to this logic is shared on-demand vehicles, provided by services like 10 
Uber and Lyft.  The behavior of these vehicles is not considered in the derivation of the Zombie 11 
Tax, because the behavior is largely unknown.  Transportation Network Companies are 12 
notoriously reticent about sharing their data.  While it might be necessary to subset autonomous 13 
Ubers and Lyfts when deriving the appropriate rate for the Zombie Tax, it is impossible to do so 14 
here because the data is lacking.   15 
As for the politics of implementing the rate, each jurisdiction (perhaps state or metropolitan 16 
regions) should derive their own rate suitable to the conditions in the area.  Second, the rate should 17 
be constructed to affect as many AV owners as possible in order to fully capture the benefits of 18 
the Pigovian tax.  In Atlanta, peak congestion during weekdays usually occurs during morning and 19 
evening rush hours when hundreds of thousands of commuters converge inside the Perimeter for 20 
work during the day, then return to the suburbs at night.  For Atlanta, it is appropriate to derive the 21 
Zombie Tax rate in a way that will affect the behavior of daily commuters.    22 
 23 
FINDINGS 24 
Based on the derivation above, a Zombie Tax of at least $0.14 per mile should be implemented on 25 
ICE AVs and a Zombie Tax of at least $0.23 per mile should be implemented on EAVs in Atlanta 26 
to incentivize parking and disincentivize looping behavior by the average commuter.  While 27 
backed by academic theory, this rate is highly dependent on the assumptions and policy goals 28 
underlying it.   29 
 30 
Revenue Implications of a Zombie Tax 31 
Table 2 below gives the assumptions for the Atlanta region in 2020.  These figures are from the 32 
Atlanta Regional Commission’s activity-based travel demand model for the AM peak period for 33 
2020 (27).  Those trips in the “SOV Free” column are trips that occur in exclusively general 34 
purpose lanes.  Those trips in the “SOV Paid-Elig” column are trips that occur at least in some 35 
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TABLE 2  Assumptions for the travel during the AM Peak Period for 2020 in Atlanta 1 
 2  
 SOV Free  SOV Paid-Elig SOV Total 
Daily Trips 2,585,833.0  56,927.0 2,642,760.0 
Avg Travel Time per Trip 25.1  49.4  
Avg Distance per Trip 9.0  24.5  
Total VMT for all Trips 23,272,497.0  1,394,711.5 24,667,208.5 




1% Total Daily VMT 232,725.0  13,947.1 246,672.1 
Half of 1% Total Daily VMT 116,362.5  6,973.6 123,336.0 
Qtr. of 1% of Total Daily VMT 58,181.2 3,486.8 61,668.0 
 
1% of Daily Trips 25,858.3 569.3 26,427.6 
Half of 1% Daily Trips 12,929.2 284.6 13,213.8 
Qtr. Of 1% of Daily Trips 6,464.6 142.3 6,606.9 
 3 
Table 3 below gives the forecasted revenue under the proposed Zombie Tax plan of $0.14 4 
per mile for ICE AVs and of $0.23 per mile for EAVs, assuming that 1% of total SOV trips are 5 
made by AV in 2020, and assuming that 50% of those AV trips choose to loop, and assuming that 6 
50% of those looping trips are made by ICE AVs and the other 50% of those looping trips are 7 
made by EAVs. 8 
 9 
TABLE 3  Forecasted Revenue for 2020 for the AM peak period in Atlanta for ICE AVs 10 
 11  
Daily Weekly Annual 
Zombie Tax Revenue for ICE AVs  $      8,633.52   $    43,167.61   $    2,072,045.51  
Zombie Tax Revenue for EAVs  $    14,183.64  $    70,918.22   $    3,404.074.77  
    
Total Zombie Tax Revenue $    22,817.17 $  114,085.84  $    5,476,120.29 
 12 
 Table 4 below gives the forecasted combined revenue from AVs that choose to loop (and 13 
therefore pay the Zombie Tax) and from AVs that choose to park (and therefore pay the parking 14 
costs in the Atlanta CBD).  The calculations in Table 4 hold the same assumptions as in Table 3, 15 
that 1% of total SOV trips in 2020 are made by AVs, and that 50% of those AV trips choose to 16 
loop and the other 50% choose to park. 17 
  18 
TABLE 4  Forecasted Combined Revenue for 2020 for the AM peak period in Atlanta 19 
 20  
Daily Weekly Annual 
Zombie Tax Revenue  $    22,817.17  $  114,085.84   $    5,476,120.29  
Parking Revenue  $    90,910.94   $  454,554.72   $  21,818,626.56  
    
Total AV Revenue  $  113,728.11   $  568,640.56   $  27,294,746.85  
  21 
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If the Atlanta region charged a $0.14 per mile Zombie Tax on ICE AVs and a $0.23 per 1 
mile Zombie Tax on EAVs in 2020, they could expect to capture 123,336 miles per day, equaling 2 
$22,817.17 generated by the tax per day.  The ARC’s travel demand model assumes that the AM 3 
peak period scenario applies five days per week, from Monday to Friday.  Therefore, the weekly 4 
revenue estimate is the daily estimate multiplied by five, or $114,085.84 per week.  To be 5 
conservative in the estimate, the annual figure assumes that the weekly behavior will occur for 48 6 
out of the 52 weeks in a year, accounting for holidays and vacations that full-time works usually 7 
experience.  Therefore, the annual revenue estimate is the weekly estimate multiplied by 48, or 8 
$5,476,120.29 per year.  9 
 In short, Atlanta could generate more than $5 million per year from the Zombie Tax and 10 
more than $21 million per year from parking fees on AVs if they are proactive in implementing 11 
economic policies to guide the growth of AV use in the region. 12 
 13 
Public acceptance in general and in Atlanta 14 
A 2011 paper by Sjoquist et al. provides a thorough survey of Atlanta area drivers’ stated 15 
preferences and anticipated behavioral responses to various alternative revenue generating 16 
mechanisms that could be implemented in the state of Georgia.  While none of the alternative 17 
revenue generating mechanisms directly included a VMT tax on the zombie miles driven by AVs, 18 
the theory of VMT taxes was tested, as was an increase in the gas tax, increased parking fees, new 19 
toll roads, and managed lanes (28). 20 
 Sjoquist found that at least a third of all respondents supported the charging of a VMT tax 21 
to all travel, including travel by conventional, single-occupancy vehicles.  This support 22 
outweighed support for any level of increase to the gas tax (28).  It is promising that Georgia 23 
residents are open to the idea of VMT taxes; theoretically, they should be even more supportive of 24 
a tax that is extremely limited in application.   25 
A briefing paper prepared by the RAND Corporation for the National Surface 26 
Transportation Policy and Revenue Study Commission outlined several potential obstacles to 27 
successfully implementing a VMT tax in the United States (16).  Fortunately, most of these 28 
obstacles are avoided when the VMT tax is applied in a limited way to only zombie AVs.  For 29 
example, RAND highlights the need for separate on-board equipment to be installed to monitor 30 
location and VMT and determine if the VMT was accrued in a qualifying area (VMT accrued out-31 
of-state should not be eligible for a given state’s VMT tax, for example).  While this may be true 32 
for conventional cars, AVs all come equipped with precise GPS locators because they are 33 
necessary for autonomous navigation.  Additionally, AV owners have already opted in to their car 34 
knowing their precise location at all times and Oregon collected sensitive data without problems, 35 
so any potential privacy concerns are assuaged.  The RAND study also states that VMT tax would 36 
need to be phased in over time to increase public awareness and acceptance.  This is not true for a 37 
Zombie Tax; if the tax is implemented before AVs are commercially available for sale, the tax is 38 
just another feature of AV ownership.   39 
 40 
CONCLUSION 41 
AV technology promises to usher in a new era of transportation in the modern world.  While it is 42 
likely that countless lives will be saved to the increased safety capacity of these vehicles, it is also 43 
possible that AVs will enable new trip behaviors that could be detrimental to the transportation 44 
network.  The ability for the AV to drop off its occupants at a destination, then drive itself to a free 45 
parking location away from the destination, then return to the destination at a pre-determined time 46 
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to pick up the occupants is a new behavior deemed “looping.”  This looping behavior increases 1 
the number of trips made and the amount of VMT accrued on the transportation network.  If left 2 
unchecked, this increased VMT will cause a sharp uptick in the marginal social cost of using the 3 
roads until they are in a state of constant congestion.  AVs will spend their time trying to access 4 
free parking, instead of accessing the available parking nearby. 5 
 Planners and policymakers have the rare opportunity to identify these potentially negative 6 
externalities and implement proactive policies to ward off the most detrimental effects.  A 7 
Pigovian-style tax on VMT for so-called “zombie cars” (those operating without any passengers) 8 
could help to incentivize parking instead of looping.  Two rate formulas were derived above (one 9 
formula for ICE AVs and another formula for EAVs) and those formulas were applied to the 10 
Atlanta area and calibrated to incentivize parking during a typical AM peak period commute.  The 11 
appropriate rate for ICE AVs is $0.14 per mile and the appropriate rate for EAVs is $0.23 per mile.  12 
If Atlanta were to implement these rates, they could generate over $5 million annually from the 13 
Zombie Tax and another $21 million annually from AVs that choose to park instead of drive 14 
around.  This revenue could be applied to the rest of the transportation network in the region 15 
(primarily transit services) to encourage those drivers wishing to switch modes as a result of the 16 
increased cost of driving. 17 
 As advanced technology enables increasingly convenient behavior, planners and 18 
policymakers must harness all the tools at their disposal to encourage the most socially beneficial 19 
behavior possible in order to ensure a safe, healthy, and productive environment for all the region’s 20 
residents.  21 
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